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Capital Requirements For Merchant Banking
I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Reserve Board (the Fed) and the U.S.
Treasury Department (the Treasury) are in the midst of a rule-
writing process implementing the private equity, or as it is often
called, merchant banking, provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act (GLBA).' In March of 2000, the Fed and the Treasury jointly
issued an interim rule2 governing merchant banking (March 2000
interim rule), while a separate rule also governing merchant
banking was proposed only by the Fed (March 2000 proposed
rule) .? The March 2000 interim rule provided guidance on the type
of investments that were allowed as merchant banking
investments,' and the March 2000 proposed rule proposed a fifty
percent regulatory capital charge to all merchant banking
investments.5 On January 10, 2001, the Fed and Treasury replaced
the March 2000 interim rule with a final rule, effective February
15, 2001 (January 2001 Final Rule).6 Then on January 18, 2001, the
Fed and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
replaced the March 2000 proposed rule with the announcement of
a second proposed rule (January 2001 proposed rule).'
1. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-
102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
2. Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 65 Fed. Reg. 16,460
(Mar. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 and 12 C.F.R. pt. 1500)
[hereinafter March 2000 Interim Rule].
3. Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 65 Fed. Reg. 16,480
(Mar. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225) [hereinafter March 2000
Proposed Rule].
4. March 2000 Interim Rule, supra note 2.
5. March 2000 Proposed Rule, supra note 3, at 16,481.
6. Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, at http://www.federal
reserve.gov/boarddocs/pressboardacts/2001/200101 10/DEFAULT.HTM
(last modified Jan. 10, 2001) [hereinafter January 2001 Final Rule].
7. Description of Capital Proposal, at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
pressfboardacts/2001/20010118/attachment.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2001) [hereinafter
January 2001 Proposed Rule].
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Additionally, the Fed has released a supervisory letter that
provides guidelines on equity investment and merchant banking
activities.8
While the January 2001 final rule governing merchant
banking was generally lauded by the industry,9 this final rule did
not address the hotly debated capital charge raised in the March
2000 proposed rule. 0 Indeed, prior to the finalization of the March
2000 interim rule, House Banking Capital Markets Subcommittee
Chairman Richard Baker (R-La.) told a panel of regulators that
the proposed fifty percent capital charge on banking organizations
could freeze the progress made for the financial services industry
in GLBA." In fact, the industry overwhelmingly opposed the
proposed fifty percent capital charge, as only one of the ninety-two
public comment letters submitted to the Fed was fully supportive
of the merchant banking provisions. 2 In response to these
8. Letter from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to the
Officer in Charge of Supervision and Appropriate Supervisory Staff at Each Federal
Reserve Bank and to Financial Holding Companies and Other Banking
Organizations Supervised by the Federal Reserve that Engage in Equity Investment
and Merchant Banking Activities (June 22, 2000), available at http://www.
federalreserve.govlBoardDocs/SRLetters/2000/srOO09.htm (last modified June 23,
2000) [hereinafter Supervisory Letter].
9. Beth L. Climo, News Release, ABA Securities Association, ABA Securities
Association Statement on Merchant Banking Rule, available at http:/www.
aba.com/Press+Room/securityOllO01.htm. (Jan. 10, 2001). "We are pleased with the
additional flexibility provided today by the Federal Reserve Board in its final rule on
merchant banking." Id.; see also Richard Cowden, Fed Adopts Final Rule on
Merchant Banking; Capital Rule Considered in Closed Session, 76 Banking Rep.
(BNA) 45-46 (Jan. 16, 2001) (Richard Whiting, executive director and general
counsel of the Financial Services Roundtable, said that he was pleased that the Fed
addressed "several key concerns" raised in the interim rule.).
10. The capital rule was considered in a session closed to the public on January
11, 2001. Cowden, supra note 9.
11. Eileen Canning, Merchant Banking: Baker, Committee Members Grill
Regulators on Merchant Banking Rules' Capital Charge, 74 Banking Rep. (BNA)
1039-41 (June 12, 2000). Further, five Republican and three Democratic Senate
Banking Committee members took "strong exception" to the proposed rule in a July
19, 2000 letter to Federal Reserve Board Governor Laurence H. Meyer. Adam
Wasch, Senate Banking Committee Members Criticize Fed's Merchant Banking
Proposal, 75 Banking Rep. (BNA) (July 25, 2000).
12. See Wasch, supra note 11, at 174. The Independent Community Bankers of
America fully supports both the interim and proposed rules. Letter from Thomas J.
Sheehan, President of Independent Community Bankers of America, to Ms. Jennifer
J. Johnson, Secretary, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and
Merchant Banking Regulation, Office of Financial Institutions Policy, U.S.
Department of Treasury (March 30, 2000), available at http://www.ibaa.org
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comment letters, as well as congressional opposition to the
proposed rule, the Fed and the OCC replaced the proposed rule
with the January 2001 proposed rule which proposed a regulatory
capital charge based on a sliding scale.'3
The merchant banking provisions of GLBA will have "far-
reaching" effects on financial services and the capital markets.
Although the market climate has recently changed, attraction of
banking organizations to the high returns and the once, seemingly
buoyant stock prices, especially for IPOs, paralleled the growth in
the entire merchant banking market.'5 In the past three years,
more private equity financing, particularly venture capital
financing, was accomplished than in the previous thirty years.'6 In
the fourth quarter of 1999 and the first quarter of 2000, almost as
much venture capital was invested as was invested over the
previous four quarters ending in September of 1999.'" Federal
Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan remarked that about
155 domestic and more than ten foreign financial holding
companies (FHCs) could-but not necessarily would-undertake
merchant banking. As Laurence H. Meyer, member of the Board
/news.views/news-views_fr.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2001) [hereinafter Sheehan
Letter].
13. January 2001 Proposed Rule, supra note 7.
14. Hearing on Capital Markets in the New Economy Before the H.R. Subcomm.
on Capital Mkts., Sec., and Gov't Sponsored Enterprises (June 7, 2000) (opening
statement of Richard H. Baker, Chairman, Subcomm. On Capital Mkts., Sec., and
Gov't), available at http://www.house.gov/financialservices/6700bak.htm (last visited
Feb. 28, 2001) [hereinafter H.R. Subcomm. Hearing, Baker Statement]. " 'Whether it
is a coffee shop oran Internet IPO, having access to financial resources is the hub
and core of continuing the enormous prosperity this country has enjoyed,' Baker
said." Baker Releases Letter to Fed and Treasury on Merchant Banking Rules (Sept.
20, 2000), available at http://www.house.gov/financialservices/92000bak.htm (last
visited Feb. 28, 2001).
15. Hearing on Capital Markets in the New Economy Before the H.R. Subcomm.
on Capital Mkts., Sec. and Gov't Sponsored Enterprises (June 7, 2000) (statement by
Laurence H. Meyer, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.) available
at http:lwww.house.gov/financialservices/6700mey.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2001)
[hereinafter H.R. Subcomm. Hearing, Meyer Statement].
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Chairman Alan Greenspan, Remarks on Banking Evolution at the 35'
Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago, (May 3, 2000) at 5, available at 2000 WL 548778 [hereinafter
Greenspan Remarks]. "Two-thirds of the financial holding companies have less than
$500 million in assets; about one-third have less than $150 million." Id.
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of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, commented, "[t]he
contribution of a broad and deep private equity market to
economic growth is considerable and its existence is critical to our
nation's continued economic vibrancy." 9
This Note begins by defining merchant banking."0 The
Note then discusses private equity investment prior to the financial
modernization legislation."1  Then, the Note sets forth the
merchant banking provisions of GLBA, the interim rule, and the
changes made to the interim rule in the final rule." Next, the Note
focuses on the proposed rules by examining the arguments in favor
of, as well as, against the first proposed fifty percent regulatory
capital charge, and ultimately the manner in which the second
proposal responds to these arguments.23
II. WHAT IS MERCHANT BANKING?
Merchant banking is an activity that is, often loosely
defined.24 The term derives from the practices of early European
financial intermediaries and was formalized in the rise in the
nineteenth century of' so-called merchant banks, whose loan
activity became the origin of securities underwriting. 5 Merchant
banking has since developed to the point that Fed Chairman, Alan
Greenspan defines it as "financial equity investment in
nonfinancial firms, most often, but not always, in nonpublic
companies, with the investor providing both capital and financial
19. H.R. Subcomm. Hearing, Meyer Statement, supra note 15.
20. See infra notes 24-39 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 40-54 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 56-109 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 110-226 and accompanying text.
24. Compare Laurence H. Meyer Member Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, Implementing the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Address before the
American Law Institute and American Bar Association (February 3, 2000), available
at 2000 WL 127073 [hereinafter Implementing the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act]
("Under GLB, any FHC with a securities affiliate may engage in merchant banking-
the ownership (for the purpose of ultimate resale) of securities of a company."), with
S. REP. No. 106-44, at 64 (1999) ("Merchant banking refers to the practice whereby
an investment bank takes a passive equity stake in a company in connection with the
provision of financial services, such as underwriting the company's securities, with a
view towards appreciation and eventual sale.").
25. Interview with William T. Hobbs II, Senior Vice President, First Union
Securities, Inc., in Charlotte, N.C. (Oct. 6, 2000) [hereinafter Hobbs Interview].
268 [Vol. 5
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expertise to the portfolio company."2
Although some of these merchant banking investments
may be in public companies, the investment community usually
identifies merchant banking investments in unregistered shares of
private companies.' As of year-end 1999, the private equity
market represented over $400 billion in assets under
management.' The financing of new firms via equity, or the
venture capital component, had outstandings of at least $125
billion.29 Venture capital financing focuses on seed capital for the
creation of new companies or additions of equity needed for the
continuation or growth of small firms." The non-venture private
equity sector, the equity financing of middle-market firms and
leveraged buyouts, is a much larger share of the merchant banking
market, with outstandings of about $275 billion.3
Treasury Under Secretary Gary Gensler commented that
"[tihe most important thing to understand about investments in
the private equity market... is that these investments are
generally higher risk, longer term, illiquid investments."32 Private
equity investments are higher risk, because they are generally
made in higher- risk companies, such as start-ups or as part of
leveraged buy-outs.33 In the expectation of greater returns for
26. Greenspan Remarks, supra note 18. A Senate Banking Committee Press
Release states that "[mlerchant bankers provide debt and/or equity to new and
existing ventures and companies for the purpose of long-term investment,
appreciation and ultimate resale of disposition." Press Release, Senate Banking
Committee, Subcommittees Schedule Joint Hearing to Examine Regulations on
Merchant Banking (June 9, 2000), available at http://www.senate.gov/-banking/
prelO0/0609subc.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2001).
27. H.R. Subcomm. Hearing, Meyer Statement, supra note 15.
28. Hearing on Capital Markets in the New Economy Before the H.R. Subcomm.
on Capital Markets, Securities and Government Sponsored Enterprises, at 2 (June 7,
2000) (statement of Gary Gensler), available at http://www.house.gov/
financialservicesI6700gen.htm [hereinafter H.R. Subcomm. Hearing, Gensler
Statement].
29. H.R. Subcomm. Hearing, Meyer Statement, supra note 15.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. H.R. Subcomm. Hearing, Gensler Statement, supra note 28.
33. Id.
2001]
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higher risks, these investments are typically held for the
intermediate to longer term.34 Also, these investments are illiquid,
as they cannot be readily bought or sold the way registered shares
of a publicly held company can be bought or sold.3' Thus, "even
with rising valuations, private equity is still the most expensive
form of finance available."3
In interviews with securities firms and bank holding
companies (BHCs), the Fed and Treasury determined that
merchant banking investment activities conducted by major
securities firms most often are conducted through private equity
funds.37 A private equity fund, otherwise known as a private
equity partnership, pools a financial institution's capital with funds
from third-party investors.' Generally, these investors are
institutions, such as other investment companies, pension funds,
endowments, charitable organizations, investment units of
financial institutions, and other companies or individuals with high
net worth.39
34. Id.
Private equity funds typically have features, including
compensation arrangements, that-in addition to the limited life of
the fund-strongly encourage the resale of investments made by
the fund. As a result of these incentives and structural
arrangements, and given current economic conditions, investments
made by private equity funds are typically sold within a period of
between [three] and [five] years. In addition, private equity funds
typically have policies, review committees or other measures that
encourage funds to diversify holdings and/or limit the amount of
the fund's capital invested in a single portfolio company.
March 2000 Interim Rule supra note 2, at 16,461.
35. H.R. Subcomm. Hearing, Gensler Statement, supra note 28.
36. H.R. Subcomm. Hearing, Meyer Statement, supra note 15. Investors in
private equity securities demand high expected returns. Id. Their expectations range
from fifteen percent to twenty-five percent returns for mature firms seeking
expansion capital, to sixty percent to eighty percent returns for early stage venture
capital investments. Id. For venture capital finance, these high hurdle rates reflect
the possibility of high loss rates on individual deals. Id. Venture capital equities do
not have sixty percent to eighty percent returns, because, as a review of the venture
capital investments over the past four decades suggests, a fourth to a third of the
deals resulted in absolute losses. Id. In both the mature firms seeking capital and the
venture capital investments, the expected returns represent risk compensation. Id.
37. Banking Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 65 Fed. Reg.




III. MERCHANT BANKING PRIOR TO THE FINANCIAL
MODERNIZATION LEGISLATION
Originally, the private equity market was funded solely by
individuals of high net worth."0  Institutions eventually became
involved through direct investments, limited partnerships, and
Small Business Investment Companies (SBICs).4 Prior to the
financial modernization legislation, banking organizations made
indirect investments in equities through private investment groups,
occasionally acting as manager of the group for performance-
based fees. 42 Currently, indirect investments account for ten to
fifteen percent of the domestic private equity market. 3 Banking
organizations also had authority to directly invest in equities via
three vehicles: SBICs,44 Edge Act corporations," and non-banking
subsidiaries under the Bank Holding Company Act.46
Since the late 1950's, banks and BHCs have been
authorized to operate SBICs that can invest in up to half of the
equity of an individual small business; currently, a small business is
defined as an entity with less than $20 million of pre-investment
capital. Edge corporations (which are mostly subsidiaries of
banks, as well as, subsidiaries of holding companies) can acquire
40. Hobbs Interview, supra note 25. In the post-war period, the Whitneys,
Rockefellers, and similarly wealthy families made significant venture capital
investments. H.R. Subcomm. Hearing, Gensler Statement, supra note 28.
41. H.R. Subcomm. Hearing, Gensler Statement, supra note 28.
42. Greenspan Remarks, supra note 18:
43. Id.
44. 15 U.S.C.A. § 687 (2000).
45. 12 U.S.C.A. § 611 (2000).
46. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843 (2000); Greenspan Remarks, supra note 18.
47. Greenspan Remarks, supra note 18. For thousands of U.S. small businesses,
SBICs are a major source of critical venture capital. Hearing on Capital Markets in
the New Economy Before the H.R. Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Securities and
Government Sponsored Enterprises 2 (June 7, 2000) (statement of Lee W. Mercer,
National Association of Small Business Investment Companies), available at
http://www/house.gov/financialservices/6700mer.htm. (last visited Feb. 28, 2001)
[hereinafter, H.R. Subcomm. Hearing, Mercer Statement]. In particular, bank-owned
SBICs accounted for $2.9 billion (68%) of the $4.2 billion total. Id. A total of 101
bank-owned SBICs currently hold $5.3 billion in capital assets. Id. This amount of
capital assets is sixty-one percent of the total $8.73 billion in private capital invested
in all SBICs. Id. The total 3,096 SBIC transactions, the Small Business
Administration (SBA) estimates, represented approximately 50% of the number of
venture capital transactions in the United States during FY 1999. Id.
2001]
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up to twenty percent of the voting equity and forty percent of the
total equity of nonfinancial companies outside the United States."
Finally, BHCs can acquire up to five percent of the voting shares
and up to twenty-five percent of the total equity of any company
without aggregate limit."
A small number of large banking organizations represent
most of the equity participation by banking organizations in
general.5" The activities of these large banking organizations focus
on the private equity market and their holdings typically account
for a significant proportion of their capital and earnings."
Investments by banking organizations account for nearly ten
percent of the total investments in the private equity market."
While their market share remains limited, the ten U.S. banking
organizations with the largest commitment to equity investments
have in the past five years almost doubled their holdings, with
aggregate investments in excess of $30 billion at carrying values.
These holdings represent an estimated ninety percent of holdings
by all banking organizations of private equities in nonfinancial
firms.54
IV. MERCHANT BANKING PROVISIONS OF THE
GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT
Because merchant banking is such an important part of the
business of many securities firms, a security firm would be
deterred from affiliating with a bank if the firm were required to
divest its merchant banking activity.55 Conversely, most banks
48. Greenspan Remarks, supra note 10.
49. Id.
50. H.R. Subcomm. Hearing, Meyer Statement, supra note 15.
51. Id.
52. H.R. Subcomm. Hearing, Gensler Statement, supra note 28.
53. H.R. Subcomm. Hearing, Meyer Statement, supra note 15.
54. Id. Seven of the ten largest holders each held equities with carrying values in
excess of $1 billion at the end of 1999; two held more than $8 billion. Id. Carrying
values at the largest holders were equal to 10% to 35% of their tier 1 capital, and
both realized and unrealized gains on these holdings accounted for a growing share of
their earnings. Id.
55. Hearing on Capital Markets in the New Economy Before the H.R. Subcomm.
on Capital Mrkts., Sec., and Gov't Sponsored Enterprises (June 7, 2000) (testimony of
Marc E. Lacritz), available at http://www.house.gov/financialservices/67001ac.htm
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would not divest their traditional banking ability to affiliate with a
security firm. GLBA, however, aimed to establish a "two way
street" designed to enable securities firms and banks to affiliate
freely with each other and to ensure that securities firms, once
they become partners with banks, are not artificially restricted in
their activities." Section 103(a) of GLBA57 added a new section
4 (k) (4) (H) to the Bank Holding Company Act58 (BHC Act) which
authorizes FHCs to acquire or control shares, assets, or ownership
interests of any nonfinancial company as part of a bona fide
underwriting, merchant, or investment banking activity-i.e.,
merchant banking investments.59  To become an FHC, an
organization must be well-capitalized, be well-managed, and have
a Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) rating of at least
satisfactory.'
Under GLBA, five restrictions apply to merchant banking
investments. (1) The investment in a portfolio company6' cannot
be owned by a depository institution affiliate of the FHC, or a
[hereinafter H.R. Subcomm. Hearing, Lacritz Statement].
56. Id.
57. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
58. 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (k) (4) (H) (1994).
59. Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 65 Fed. Reg. 16,480
(Mar. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 and 12 C.F.R. pt. 1500)
60. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act §103(a), 12 U.S.C.. § 1843 (1) (Supp. V 1999).
The Board recently announced the certification process-perhaps
more accurately, the self-certification process-that BHCs must
use. This process permits any BHC-including foreign BHCs
whose banking presence in the United States is solely through
subsidiary banks-that meets the statutory qualifications I just
mentioned to file certifications immediately. The Board will check
the CRA component of these companies' positions as promptly as
possible so that qualifying companies may begin as early as March
13 to affiliate with, acquire, or establish a nonbank financial
institution engaging in any activity already authorized explicitly by
GLB, or subsequently authorized jointly by the Board and the
Treasury.
Implementing the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, supra note 20, at 1.
61. See infra text accompanying notes 117-119. A portfolio company is a
company engaged in an activity not otherwise permissible for an FHC. H. Rodgin
Cohen, Merchant Banking Rules, in AFTER THE GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY AcT: A
ROAD MAP FOR BANKS, SECURITIES FIRMs AND INVESTMENT MANAGERS 601, 605 (H.
Rodgin Cohen & William J. Sweet, Jr. Co-Chairs, Practicing Law Inst., 2000).
2001] 273
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subsidiary of a depository institution affiliate.62 (2) The investment
must be held by a securities affiliate or an affiliate of a securities
affiliate or, if the FHC is, or is owned by, an insurance company, a
subsidiary that provides investment advice to insurance companies
as a registered investment adviser.63 (3) The investment must be
part of a bona fEde underwriting or merchant or investment
banking activity, including investment activities engaged in for the
purpose of appreciation and ultimate resale or disposition. 4 (4)
The investment may be held for a period of time to enable the sale
or disposition on a reasonable basis consistent with the financial
viability of the activities. (5) Except in situations in which routine
involvement is necessary or required to obtain a reasonable return
on investment upon resale or disposition of the investment, the
FHC must not engage in routine management or operation of the
portfolio company.
The merchant banking authority included in GLBA
thereby develops the two-way street for securities firms that wish
to affiliate with a bank without being required to divest traditional
business lines.67 Moreover, this new merchant banking authority is
in addition to-and does not replace-the authority that BHCs
have under other provisions of the BHC Act to engage in equity
investment activities.68
V. MERCHANT BANKING RULES
As Senator Robert Bennett (R-Utah), chairman of the
Subcommittee on Financial Institutions, indicated, the
incorporation of the merchant banking provisions in GLBA was a
critical element of the banking modernization process. Senator





67. HR. Subcomm. Hearing, Meyer Statement, supra note 15.
68. Id.
69. Press Release, Senate Banking Committee, Subcommittees Schedule Joint





Bennett said, "It was our strong desire to limit any unduly
burdensome restrictions put forth by the financial regulators."70
Yet, the proposed merchant banking rules imposed a number of
restrictions that extended beyond the statutory limits of GLBA.71
A. March 2000 Interim Rule
The March 2000 interim rule, which has been supplanted by
the January 2001 final rule, was proposed jointly by the Fed and
Treasury."Z The March 2000 interim rule applied only to activities
conducted under the new merchant banking authority of GLBA
and did not apply to investments made under previous authority.73
The March 2000 interim rule, like the January 2001 final rule,
provided guidance on the type of investments that were permitted
as merchant banking investments.'
The interim rule also established two caps on the amount of
merchant banking investments made under the new merchant
banking authority. ' The first cap prevented the total amount of a
FHC's merchant banking investments from exceeding the lesser of
thirty percent of the FHC's Tier 1 capital, or $6 billion. 76 The
second cap applied to merchant banking investments other than
investments made by the FHC in private equity funds and was the
lesser of twenty percent of Tier 1 capital, or $4 billion. 77
Further, the interim rule adopted the GLBA limitations on
70. Id.
71. H. Rodgin Cohen, Merchant Banking Rules, in AFTER THE GRAMM-LEACH-
BLILEY ACT: A ROAD MAP FOR BANKS, SECURITIES FIRMS AND INVESTMENT
MANAGERS 601, 606 (H. Rodgin Cohen & William J. Sweet, Jr., Co-Chairs,
Practicing Law Inst., 2000).
72. Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 65 Fed. Reg. 16,460
(Mar. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 and 12 C.F.R. pt. 1500).
73. H.R. Subcomm. Hearing, Gensler Statement, supra note 28. Some
commenters argued that the interim rule was unclear as to whether it applied to
investments made via authorities other than 4(k) (4) (H). January 2001 Final Rule,
supra note 6 at 9. The final rule, however, affirmed Gensler's statement by clarifying
that the final rule applies only to the authority granted by 4(k) (4) (H). Id. at 10.
74. Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 65 Fed. Reg. 16,460,
16,473 (Mar. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 and 12 C.F.R. pt. 1500).
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cross-marketing products or services of a depository institution
controlled by a FHC with the FHC's portfolio company."8 Also, as
established in GLBA, the interim rule maintained a rebuttable
presumption of control for purposes of sections 23A and 23B of
the Federal Reserve Act.79 Thus, if the FHC owned or controlled
fifteen percent or more of the equity capital of a portfolio
company, the portfolio company was presumed to be an affiliate of
any member bank that was affiliated with the FHC" A FHC was
allowed to rebut this presumption by providing information
acceptable to the Fed, demonstrating that the FHC did not control
the company." Nevertheless, if a FHC's investment exceeded
fifteen percent of a portfolio company's equity capital, a FHC's
ability to extend credit to a portfolio company was "severely
restricted.""
B. January 2001 Final Rule
On January 10, 2001, the Fed and Treasury jointly replaced
the March 2000 interim rule with the January 2001 final rule that
became effective on February 15, 2001."3 Incorporating a number
of amendments in response to public comments on the interim
rule, the final rule reduces potential regulatory burdens and
clarifies application of the rule as compared to the interim rule.
By expanding the definition of "securities affiliate," (that is
permitted under GLBA to make merchant banking investments)
the final rule broadens the eligibility of FHC's to make merchant
banking investments. A securities affiliate is defined in the final
rule to include a registered municipal securities dealer which in
turn includes a division or department of a bank that is registered
78. Id. at 16,476.
79. Id.; see also, Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 371c-371c-1 (2000).
80. Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 65 Fed. Reg. 16,460,
16476 (Mar. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 and 12 C.F.R. pt. 1500).
81. Id.
82. Paul J. Polking & Scott A. Cammarn, Overview of the Gramm-Leach-Blley
Act, 4 N.C. BANKING INST. 1, 4 n.13 (2000).
83. January 2001 Final Rule, supra note 6.




as a municipal securities dealer under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934.86
The final rule also modifies limitations in the interim rule
on managing or operating a portfolio company.' The final rule
maintains the interim rule definition of relationships that represent
managing or operating; but to give more guidance, the final rule
modifies the interim rule by constructing certain presumptions in
which particular types of relationships represent managing or
operating. Moreover, the final rule explains when a FHC may
routinely manage and operate a portfolio company." This
explanation limits the duration of which a FHC may routinely
manage or operate a portfolio company to the period of time that
may be necessary to address the cause of the FHC's involvement,
to obtain suitable alternative management arrangements, to
dispose of the investment, or to otherwise obtain a reasonable
return upon the resale or disposition of the investment."
Further, the January 2001 final rule clarifies GLBA's
requirement that a FHC hold a merchant banking investment only
for a period long enough to enable the sale or disposition of each
investment on a reasonable basis.91 Generally, direct investments
are to be held for a ten year period." The Fed is capable of
approving an extended time period in extraordinary
circumstances.93
Indirect investments, or "private equity funds," are to be
held for a maximum of fifteen years. 4 This holding period is
established in a new section 225.173, devised in response to the
requests made in the comment letters to define a private equity
86. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c, 78o, 78o-4 (1994); January 2001 Final Rule, supra note 6, at
53. This expanded definition of securities affiliates pleases industry commentators by
allowing more holding companies to take advantage of merchant banking authority.
Climo, supra note 9.
87. January 2001 Final Rule, supra note 6, at 54.
88. Id. at 55.
89. Id. at 56.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 57.
92. Id. at 54.
93. January 2001 Final Rule, supra note 6, at 55.
94. Id. at 59.
20011
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fund.95 In addition to establishing a holding period, this section
describes the application of the rule's routine management and
operation restrictions to private equity funds."
Moreover, the final rule alters the risk management, record
keeping, and reporting policies required to make merchant
banking investments." The preamble to the final rule indicates
that the Fed and Treasury intended to "streamline" these policies
through the final rule requirements.98 Essentially, FHCs must
"establish and maintain policies, procedures, records and systems
reasonably designed to conduct, monitor and manage investment
activities and associated risks in a safe and sound manner.""
Additionally, the final rule clarifies the scope of the interim
rule's cross-marketing prohibitions.' 0 The Fed and Treasury,
however, recognize that companies use a wide variety of methods
to cross-market products.'0 ' Therefore, the agencies believe that
questions concerning cross-marketing should ultimately be
handled on a case-by-case basis.'" Also, when a FHC owns more
than fifteen percent of the total equity of the portfolio company
and less than twenty-five percent of any class of voting securities in
the portfolio company, the final rule addresses the rebuttable
presumption of control for purposes of sections 23A and 23B of
the Federal Reserve Act.0 3 Under the interim rule, a FHC could
rebut the presumption of control only by providing information
acceptable to the Fed demonstrating that the FHC did not control
the company.' 4 The March 2001 final rule, however, specifically
provides several safe harbors to the rebuttable presumption."'
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 61-62.
98. Id. at 5.
99. January 2001 Final Rule, supra note 6, at 36. The list of policies included in
the rule only highlight some of the most important elements of a sound approach to
monitoring merchant banking. Id. The Fed and Treasury intend for the Supervisory
Letter (Supervisory Letter, supra note 8) to more thoroughly cover all of the
elements that a FHC must have in place. Id.
100. See id. at 62.
101. Id. at 42.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 63.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 78-82.
105. See January 2001 Final Rule supra note 6, at 63. The three situations are as
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Further, the final rule reaffirms its practice of reviewing the
policies and practices governing merchant banking activities of
FHCs, even while modifying the review thresholds contained in
the interim rule.' Specifically, the final rule eliminates the dollar-
based caps on merchant banking investments. 7 Thus, without Fed
approval, a FHC's merchant banking investments must not exceed
either thirty percent of the Tier 1 capital of the FHC, or after
excluding interests in private equity funds, twenty percent of the
Tier 1 capital of the FHC.' This aggregate restriction will remain
in effect only until a final capital rule is adopted and becomes
effective."
VI. PROPOSED CAPITAL RULES
While a final rule governing the regulatory capital
treatment of equity investments by FHCs or BHCs in non-
financial firms may still be some time away,"0 the Fed has already
follows:
(i) No officer, director or employee of the FHC serves as a
director, trustee, or general partner (or individual exercising
similar functions of the company); (ii) A person that is not
affiliated or associated with the FHC owns or controls a greater
percentage of the equity capital of the portfolio company than the
amount owned or controlled by the FHC, and no more than one
officer or employee of the holding company serves as a director or
trustee (or individual exercising similar functions) of the company;
or (iii) A person that is not affiliated or associated with the FHC
owns or controls more than [fifty] percent of the voting shares of
the portfolio company, and officers and employees of the holding
company do not constitute a majority of the directors or trustees
(or individuals exercising similar functions) of the company.
Id.
106. See id. at 60-61.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 61. Robert J. Kabel, a partner at the Manatt, Phelps & Phillips law firm
in Washington who represents the banking companies most involved in merchant
banking, stated that, " 'Once the capital rule is in place, [the Fed and Treasury] will
then revisit the aggregate limit rule. What makes sense is that they will increase the
limit or phase it out. But they are perfectly capable of changing their minds."' Rob
Blackwell, Fed Seen Scaling Bank Merchant Capital Rule, AM. BANKER, Jan. 10,
2001, at 1, 4.
110. The agencies intend to request public comment within 60 days after
publication of the second proposal in the federal register. Press Release, Board of
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drafted a proposed rule,"' and after strong industry and
congressional complaint, the Fed replaced this original proposal
with a second proposal."2 Both of these proposals would amend
the Fed's consolidated capital guidelines for FHC's or BHC's Tier
1 capital."3
Tier 1 capital for banking organizations includes the
following: "common equity, minority interest in the equity
accounts of consolidated subsidiaries, qualifying noncumulative
perpetual preferred stock, and qualifying cumulative perpetual
preferred stock.""4 Cumulative perpetual preferred stock is limited
to twenty-five percent of Tier 1 capital."5 Generally, Tier 1 capital
excludes the following: "goodwill; amounts of mortgage servicing
assets, nonmortgage servicing assets, and purchased credit card
relationships that, in the aggregate, exceed 100 percent of Tier 1
capital; nonmortgage servicing assets and purchased credit card
relationships that, in the aggregate, exceed [twenty-five] percent of
Tier 1 capital; all other identifiable intangible assets; deferred tax
assets that are dependent upon future taxable income, net of their
valuation allowance, in excess of certain limitations; and [fifty]
percent of the value of portfolio investments."" 6 Additionally, the
Fed may exclude certain other investments in subsidiaries or
associated companies as it deems appropriate."7
To be adequately capitalized a bank has to maintain at least
a four percent leverage ratio (Tier 1 core capital to Assets ratio)-
that is:
Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, Agencies Release Revised Capital Proposal for Nonfinancial Equity
Investments (Jan. 18, 2001) available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
press/boardacts/200l/20010118/default.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2001).
111. Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 65 Fed. Reg. 16,480
(Mar. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225).
112. January 2001 Proposed Rule, supra note 7.
113. Id.
114. Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 65 Fed. Reg. 16,480,






Core capital (Tier 1)Leverage ratio AsetAssets
Leverage ratio > 4% "8
In addition, a bank must hold a minimum Tier 1 core
capital to risk adjusted assets ratio of four percent:
T Core capital (Tier 1)
Tier 1 core capital ratio = Risk -adjusted assets119
Tier 1 core capital ratio > 4% '20
Moreover, a bank must also hold a minimum total capital
to risk-adjusted ratio of eight percent:
Core cap. (Tier 1) + Supp. Cap.. (Tier 2)
Risk -adjusted assets
Total capital ratio > 8%...
A. March 2000 Proposed Rule
The March 2000 proposed rule would have required a FHC
or BHC to deduct from its Tier 1 regulatory capital an amount
equal to fifty percent of the total carrying value, as reflected on the
organization's consolidated financial statements, of all merchant
banking investments held by the FHC or BHC."' The total
118. 12 CFR pt. 325 (2000); see also, ANTHONY SAUNDERS, FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS MANAGEMENT: A MODERN PERSPEcTIVE 404 (Gladys True ed., Irwin
Series, 2nd ed. 1997).
119. Risk-adjusted assets = Risk-adjusted on-balance sheet assets + Risk-adjusted
off-balance-sheet assets. Id. at 405.
120. 12 CFRpt. 325 (2000); see also, SAUNDERS, supra note 118, at 404.
121. 12 CFR pt. 325 (2000); see also, SAUNDERS, supra note 118, at 403.
122. Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 65 Fed. Reg. 16,480,
16,481 (Mar. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225).
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carrying value of any merchant banking investment subject to this
capital deduction would have been excluded from the FHC's or
BHC's assets for purposes of calculating the asset denominator of
the risk-based and leverage capital ratios.In
The Fed proposed that the capital charge apply to all
portfolio investments. 4  The proposal defined a portfolio
investment as: (1) "any merchant banking investment made
directly or indirectly by the BHC pursuant to section 4 (k) (4) (H) of
the BHC Act and subpart J of Regulation Y;" and (2) "any
investment made directly or indirectly by the BHC in a
nonfmancial'" company pursuant to section 4(c) (6) or 4(c) (7) of
the BHC Act, § 211.5(b) (1) (ii) of the Board's Regulation K, or §
302(b) of the SBIC Act of 1958, or in accordance with § 24 of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act."' 26
The capital charge would have applied to all investments
that would be considered equity of the nonfinancial company and
all debt instruments that were convertible into equity.' Also, the
charge would have applied to all debt extended by a BHC to a
nonfinancial company in which the FHC owned fifteen percent or
more of the total equity.'28 Thus, the capital requirement would
have applied not only to newly authorized merchant banking
investments, but also to specified investments, including equity
investments made by banking organizations through SBICs and
Edge Act corporations, that were already permitted and on which
this capital requirement had not earlier been imposed. 9
123. Id.
124. Id. at 16,483.
125. "A nonfinancial company is an entity that engages in any activity that has not
been determined to be financial in nature or incidental to financial activities under
section 4(k) of the Bank Holding Company Act." Id.
126. Id. at 16,482-16,483.
127. Id. at 16,481.
128. Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 65 Fed. Reg. 16,480,
16481 (Mar. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225).
129. H.R. Subcomm. Hearing, Gensler Statement, supra note 28.
The proposal contains exceptions for short-term secured loans for
working capital purposes; for debt if at least 50 percent of the
initial principal balance has been syndicated to third parties; for
loans that are guaranteed by the United States government; and
for extensions of credit by an insured depository institution
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B. January 2001 Proposed Rule
On January 18, 2001, the Fed and OCC released the second
proposal for equity investments in nonfinancial companies.' This
latest proposal, however, is a significant departure from the March
2000 proposed rule."' Instead of a one-size-fits-all capital charge
of fifty percent, the January 2001 proposed rule applies a series of
marginal capital charges that increase with the level of a banking
organization's overall exposure to equity investment activities
relative to the institution's Tier 1 capital.
32
With a few exceptions, the January 2001 proposed rule's
capital treatment would apply to the same portfolio investments as
described in the March 2000 proposed rule.13 1 Specifically, the
capital requirement applies to equity investments made in
nonfinancial companies by: (i.) FHCs under the merchant banking
authority of § 4(k) (4) (H) of the BHC Act;134 (ii.) FHCs or BHCs in
less than five percent of the shares of a nonfinancial company
under the authority of § 4 (c) (6) or 4 (c) (7) of the BHC Act; (iii.)
FHCs or BHCs or banks in nonfinancial companies through
SBICs; (iv.) FHCs or BHCs or banks under Regulation K;3' and
controlled by the financial holding company that are collateralized
in accordance with the requirements of section 23A of the Federal
Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 371c) and that meet the other
requirements of that section.
Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 65 Fed. Reg. at 16,481.
130. January 2001 Proposed Rule supra note 7, at 6.
131. Rob Blackwell, Bankers Applaud Latest Version of Merchant Capital Rules,
AM. BANKER, Jan. 19, 2001, at 4.
132. January 2001 Proposed Rule, supra note 7, at 6.
133. 1d. See also, supra text accompanying notes 120-125. Like the first proposal,
the capital charge would not apply to equity investments made in companies that
engage in banking or financial activities that are permissible for the investing BHC or
bank to conduct directly. January 2001 Proposed Rule, supra note 7, at 7.
134. The Fed and OCC request comment regarding whether special capital
requirements or other supervisory restrictions should be imposed upon investments
made under § 4 (k) (4) (I) of the BHC Act by an insurance underwriting affiliate of a
FHC. January 2001 Proposed Rule, supra note 7, at 10. Like the first proposal, the
second proposal would not apply a capital charge to these investments. Id. Typically,
under state insurance laws, these investments are already subject to higher capital
charges. Id.
135. The agencies request comment on whether it is appropriate to apply the
capital charge to investments made through Edge Act corporations and Agreement
corporations in foreign, nonfinancial corporations. Id. at 11.
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(v.) banking organizations under § 24 of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act.3 '
Notably, so long as equity investments made through
SBICs are below certain thresholds relative to Tier 1 capital, the
second proposal excludes these investments from a capital
charge.'37 The second proposal also excludes from a capital charge
any investment in a nonfinancial company held by a state bank in
accordance with the grandfather provisions of § 24(f) of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDI Act).138 If in the aggregate a
bank's investments under § 24 and a bank's SBIC investments
represent less than fifteen percent of the Tier 1 capital of the bank,
the Board of Directors of the FDIC may permit a lower capital
deduction for investments approved by the Board of Directors
under § 24 of the FDI Act.'
The January 2001 proposed rule also differs from the
March 2000 proposed rule with respect to debt that is extended to
portfolio companies. Where an equity feature, such as a warrant
and an option to purchase equities in a nonfinancial company, or
debt instrument convertible into equity investment in a
nonfinancial company is held under one of the authorities to which
the capital charge applies, the second proposal applies a capital
charge to the equity feature of debt and to a debt instrument.'40
The primary supervisor will monitor debt held under any authority
that is used to provide the equivalent of equity funding to portfolio
companies."' On a case-by-case basis, "where the debt serves as
the functional equivalent of equity," the supervisor may "require
banking organizations to maintain higher capital against debt."'
4
1
While the March 2000 proposed rule applied a fifty percent
capital charge across the board, the January 2001 proposed rule
involves a progression of capital charges that increases with the
size of the aggregate equity investment portfolio relative to the
136. Id. at 6-7.
137. Id. at 9
138. Id.
139. Id. at 9 n.1. "The FDIC and the other banking agencies reserve the authority
to impose higher capital charges where appropriate." Id.





Tier 1 capital.' The deduction from an organization's Tier 1
capital would be based on the adjusted carrying value44 of equity
investments in nonfinancial companies. 4'
If the adjusted carrying value of a BHC's SBIC investments
or a bank's SBIC investments does not exceed fifteen percent of
the Tier 1 capital of the depository institution that holds the
investment, or in the case of an SBIC held directly by the BHC,
fifteen percent of the pro rata Tier 1 capital of all depository
institutions controlled by the BHC, no additional capital charge
would be applied to the SBIC investment.'46
If the adjusted carrying value of all equity investments in
nonfinancial companies, including all SBIC investments and other
covered investments, represent less than fifteen percent of Tier 1
capital, then the second proposal would apply an eight percent
charge to the organization's Tier 1 capital.147 If the adjusted
carrying value of all equity investments in nonfinancial companies,
including all SBIC investments and other covered investments,
represents at least fifteen percent of Tier 1 capital and less than
twenty-five percent of Tier 1 capital, then the second proposal
would apply a twelve percent Tier 1 capital charge to the portion
of the investment that exceeds the fifteen percent threshold.'48 If
the adjusted carrying value of all equity investments in
nonfinancial companies, including all SBIC investments and other
covered investments, represents at least twenty-five percent of
Tier 1 capital, then the second proposal would apply a twenty-five
percent Tier 1 capital charge to the portion of the investment that
exceeds the twenty-five percent threshold.'
143. Id. at 12.
144. The adjusted carrying value is defined as "the value at which the relevant
investment is recorded on the balance sheet, reduced by net unrealized gains that are
included in carrying value but that have not been included in Tier 1 capital and
associated deferred tax liabilities." Id.
145. Id. at 12.
146. January Proposed Rule, supra note 7, at 12.
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VII. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED CAPITAL CHARGES
While several provisions of the interim rule had attracted
criticism, it was the fifty percent capital charge of the March 2000
proposed rule that had the Subcommittee on Capital Markets
"particularly concerned"'50 and to which five Republican and three
Democratic Senate Banking Committee members took "strong
exception." '51 The remainder of this article, therefore, focuses on
the debate that surrounded the first proposed capital charge, and
the more polished response in the second proposal.'2
A. Arguments on behalf of the March 2000 Proposed Rule
The Fed proposed the fifty percent capital rule in order to
reflect the risk profiles of private equity investment activities."'
The Fed's proposal received the full support of the Independent
Community Bankers of America who agreed that the capital
proposal was a necessary precaution to prevent buildup of
excessive risk within banking organizations from merchant
banking activities."4
In the Fed's interviews of securities firms and others that
made merchant banking investments, the Fed recognized that
merchant banking investments were often riskier, less liquid, and
more volatile than many other types of investments and often
involved an investment in a leveraged company."' Consequently,
the Fed determined that these investments required greater capital
support, careful monitoring and valuation systems, specific policies
150. Letter from Richard H. Baker, Chairman, Subcommittee on Capital Markets,
Securities, and Government Sponsored Enterprises to the Honorable Laurence H.
Meyer, Member, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System and the Honorable
Lawrence H. Summers, Secretary, U.S. Department of Treasury (Sept. 18, 2000),
available at http://www.house.gov/financialservices/92000bak.htm (last visited Feb.
28, 2001) [hereinafter Baker Letter].
151. See Canning, supra note 11, at 1040.
152. See infra text accompanying notes 153-226.
153. Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 65 Fed. Reg. 16,480,
16,481 (Mar. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225).
154. Sheehan Letter, supra note 11.
155. Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 65 Fed. Reg. 16,460,
16,462 (Mar. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 and 12 C.F.R. pt. 1500).
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for addressing diversification of investments, and carefully
developed limits on the amount of funds put at risk in the
activity.'
56
Particularly, the Fed viewed this capital proposal as a
precaution that was necessary to prevent the development within
banking organizations of excessive risk from merchant banking
and other investment activities.' In the preamble, the Fed
justified its fifty percent regulatory capital proposal: "Importantly,
the risks associated with these investment activities do not vary
according to the authority used to conduct the activity."'58 Thus,
according to the Fed, "similar investment activities should have
been given the same capital treatment regardless of the source of
legal authority to make the investment."'59
Further, the Fed regarded the still current eight percent
minimum total capital charge (four percent Tier 1 capital charge)
as the product of a time when the investment activities of banking
organizations were relatively small.6" The Independent
Community Bankers of America noted that taking equity positions
in technology firms without positive earnings records-as was
permitted by the merchant banking authority of GLBA-was a
risky business.' Such investments could have contributed to the
increased risk posed by large complex banking organizations about
which Federal Reserve Board Governor Meyer had warned. 2
With the expanded level of investment activity by banking
organizations, the Fed found it appropriate to revisit and revise
regulatory capital treatment for all investment activities.'63
Moreover, the Fed asserted that the March 2000 proposed
156. Id.
157. Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 65 Fed. Reg. 16,480,
16,481 (Mar. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225).
158. Id.
159. Id. The proposed capital treatment, as noted by the Fed and the Treasury, is
"similar" to the capital sufficiency approach under section 24 of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act for investments in subsidiaries that engage in principal activities that
are not permissible for a national bank. Id.
160. Id.
161. Sheehan Letter, supra note 11.
162. Id. See also H.R. Subcomm. Hearing, Meyer Statement, supra note 15.
163. Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 65 Fed. Reg. 16,480,
16,481 (Mar. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225).
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rule was consistent with industry practices in managing the risks
associated with merchant banking investments.' " According to the
Fed, securities firms and BHCs uniformly applied higher internal
capital charges against merchant banking investments than were
applied to many other types of activities."5 These internal
measures were a function of the volatility and illiquidity of many
investments, and the fact that portfolio companies were
themselves often leveraged with capital contributed by investors.'0
Further, in developing the March 2000 proposed rule, the
Fed considered the effect of the proposal on existing activities of
BHCs.'67 "As an initial matter, adoption of the capital proposal
would not prevent any holding company from becoming or
remaining a [FHC] or from taking advantage of the new powers
granted under the [GLBA]."'68 Also, the Fed contended that with
virtually no exception, BHCs would remain well capitalized on a
164. Id. at 16,480. However, the Fed also asserts in a statement inconsistent with
its fifty percent capital proposal that "[f]irms that make merchant banking
investments impose internal capital charges that differ by firm and, in some cases, by
type of investment. These capital charges range from 25 percent to 100 percent of
the investment." Id.
165. Id. The Independent Community Bankers of America also note that the
ratings from Standards and Poor's have expressed a similar view. See Sheehan
Letter, supra note 11. Standard & Poor's issued a news release on March 27, 2000 in
which the agency agreed with the proposed 50 percent capital charge for private
equity investments by banks, so long as the bank's portfolio is mature and diversified.
Id. If the portfolio is not mature or diversified, Standard & Poor's even went so far
as to suggest that the portfolio could need up to 100 percent capital. Id. Moreover,
Standard & Poor's stated that there would be no ratings implications from the 50
percent capital requirement because the firm has historically allocated this level of
capital for bank private equity investments. Id.
166. Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 65 Fed. Reg. 16,480,
16,482 (Mar. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225). With the exception of
occasionally relying on short-term leverage that is repaid with a capital call on
investors, private equity funds do not appear to rely to any significant extent on debt
to fund investment activities. Id.
167. Id. at 16,481.
168. Id.
The capital charge would be applied only at the holding company
level on the consolidated organization. Consequently, the capital
proposal would not affect the capital levels of any depository
institution -which, under the GLB Act, determine whether a
company qualifies to be a financial holding company-controlled
by a bank holding company.
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consolidated basis after applying the proposed capital charge.'
Thus, the Fed did not expect the capital proposal to have a
significant effect on the level of investment activities conducted by
BHCs. '
Finally, the Fed contended that the March 2000 proposed
rule did not exceed its regulatory power. The Fed claimed
authorization to promulgate rules, including capital standards,
consistent with the requirements and purposes of the BHC Act
and other provisions."' The Treasury noted that Congress
considered the appropriateness of capital standards at the holding
company level and did not limit the Fed's authority to develop
appropriate capital requirements for BHCs or FHCs."2
Greenspan acknowledged that in recent decades there have
been no significant problems in the private equity markets. 3 He
attributed part of this success, however, to the substantial internal
capital support that securities firms and BHCs tended to allocate
to merchant banking activities.' 4 Additionally, Greenspan points
to impressive rates of return in recent years that reflect the
substantial rise in equity prices.' 5 Even recently, during the
longest bull market in history, the Fed admonished that the
unusual returns in the private equity market were dominated by a
small number of great successes.' 6 And lately, of course, the bull
market has turned down, particularly in the technology sector in
which private equity provides support to start-ups.
B. Arguments against the March 2000 Proposed Rule
Opponents of the fifty percent capital proposal pointed to
the success acknowledged by Fed Chairman Greenspan as




172. HR. Subcomm. Hearing, Meyer Statement, supra note 15.
173. Greenspan Remarks, supra note 10, at 6.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. HR. Subcomm. Hearing, Meyer Statement, supra note 7.
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information systems developed by the firms themselves.'" To
maintain the successful record of the financial services industry
participating in the private equity market, the opponents of the
proposal argued that internal controls should not be disturbed."8
House Banking Subcommittee Capital Markets Chairman
Richard H. Baker and nine other Banking Committee Members
sent a letter to Federal Reserve Board Governor Laurence H.
Meyer and Treasury Secretary Lawrence H. Summers expressing
concerns regarding the proposed rule.'9 The letter indicated that
the Subcommittee shared the intent of the Fed and the Treasury to
address safety and soundness concerns while simultaneously
encouraging private equity investment by FHCs and BHCs. 0 The
Subcommittee, however, stated that the March 2000 proposed rule
undermined this intent. ' The Subcommittee felt that "a fifty-
percent capital charge would discourage merchant banking
participation by [FHCs], would dissuade financial services
companies that currently participate in significant merchant
banking activities from becoming FHCs, and would require
extensive alteration of sophisticated risk-based capital models
already in existence at many safe and sound institutions."'82
The letter expressed the Subcommittee's understanding
that the authority and scope of merchant banking activities were
177. HR. Subcomm. Hearing, Lacritz Statement, supra note 55. Jeffrey Walker,
Managing Partner of Chase Capital Partners, testifying on behalf of the Financial
Services Roundtable, stated that banks and BHCs have engaged for decades In
activities that the Board says are identical in risk to merchant banking activities.
Hearing on Capital Markets in the New Economy Before the HR. Subcomm. on
Capital Mrkts., Sec. and Gov't Sponsored Enterprises 3 (June 7, 2000) (testimony of
Jeffrey Walker, Managing Partner, Chase Capital Partners, on behalf of the Financial
Services Roundtable) available at http:llwww.house/gov/financialservices/6700wal.
htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2001) [hereinafter HR. Subcomm. Hearing, Walker
Testimony]. Mr. Walker noted that they have done so without any threat to safety
and soundness. Id.
178. HR. Subcomn. Hearing, Walker Testimony, supra note 177.
179. Press Release, Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Securities and
Government Sponsored Enterprises, Baker Releases Letter to Fed and Treasury on
Merchant Banking Rules (Sept. 20, 2000), available at http://www.house/gov/financial






specifically defined in GLBA. '" While capital adequacy was an
important safety and soundness consideration, GLBA did not
specifically authorize a regulation that establishes a particular
capital level."4 Therefore, according to the Subcommittee, the fifty
percent capital proposal represented a hindrance to the financial
modernization envisioned by passage of GLBA. '85
Moreover, the Securities Industry Association (SIA), as
well as the Financial Services Roundtable (the Roundtable),
objected to the Fed's presumption that FHCs would remain well
capitalized even after the capital charge. 8 Institutions typically
need to maintain higher internal capital to preserve a cushion
above their regulatory capital requirements. '87 That cushion serves
a variety of purposes, such as providing protection from
unanticipated events and ensuring high ratings.' The SIA and the
Roundtable argued that a mandatory increase in the required
regulatory capital for merchant banking did not eliminate the need
for institutions to maintain a cushion above their regulatory
minimums."' Thus, the proposed capital charge would have
required FHCs and BHCs to increase their capital levels, which
would distort their earnings, stock prices and possibly debt ratings,
and would inhibit the ability of securities firms affiliated with
FHCs to supply venture capital to small and mid-sized
businesses. 8
Further, securities firms argued that the capital charge of
the March 2000 proposed rule was prohibitively expensive, as it
allegedly increased the amount of capital that a holding company
would have to carry against a covered investment by
approximately 800 percent. 1"1 The cost of making private equity
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Baker Letter, supra note 179.
186. HR. Subcomm. Hearing, Walker Testimony, supra note 177. See also, HR.
Subcomm. Hearing, Lacritz Statement, supra note 55.
187. HR. Subcomm. Hearing, Lacritz Statement, supra note 55.
188. Id.
189. Id.; HR. Subcomm. Hearing, Walker Testimony, supra note 177.
190. HR. Subcomm. Hearing, Lacritz Statement, supra note 55.
191. HR. Subcomm. Hearng, Walker Testimony, supra note 177.
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investments would thereby multiply eight times.9 ' The SIA
recognized that the capital charge was entirely foreign to securities
firms that were unaffiliated with banks.'93 Thus, the capital
proposal competitively disadvantaged those securities firms that
were a part of a FHC and were accordingly subject to this
proposal.'94 Such an expense may have limited the two-way street
to, as Baker stated, "a one-way street, or perhaps even worse, a
parking lot."'95
C. Response of the January 2001 Proposed Rule
The January 2001 proposed rule responds to this criticism
with a significant reduction in the capital charge.' Nevertheless,
the Fed and OCC do not abandon their understanding that equity
investment activities in nonfinancial companies involve greater
risks than traditional bank and financial activities. 197 Thus, the
January 2001 proposed rule does not eliminate the Tier 1 capital
charge altogether, but instead proposes a range between eight
percent and twenty-five percent.'99 Based on current investment
levels, the Fed and OCC state that this range will not have a
significant effect on the capital levels of any major banking
192. Id.
Let us say that a FHC with $500,000 of risk-based assets and a 6%
Tier 1 capital ratio decides to make a merchant banking
investment of $50,000. Under the current capital rules, that FHC
would need to add $3,000 (6% of $50,000) of Tier 1 capital to
maintain its current 6% Tier 1 capital level. Under the Fed's
proposed rule, the FHC's risk-based assets would remain at
$500,000 after its investment, but the FHC would need to deduct
$25,000 (50% of its investment) from its Tier 1 capital. That
means, in order for the FHC to maintain its 6% Tier 1 capital level,
the $25,000 that was deducted would need to be replaced. This
$25,000 replacement is over 8 times the $3,000 in additional capital
required under the current rules.
H.R. Subcomm. Hearing, Lacritz Statement, supra note 55.
193. H.R. Subcomm. Hearing, Lacritz Statement, supra note 55.
194. Id.
195. Subcommittees Schedule Joint Hearing, supra note 69.
196. January 2001 Proposed Rule, supra note 7, at 13.
197. Id. at 4.




Further, the agencies continue to recognize the increased
activity in merchant banking from the time in which the still
current capital treatment of four percent Tier 1 capital was
established."' With equity investment activity under previous
authorities now coupled with the new merchant banking authority,
the January 2001 proposed rule requires a greater capital charge
where an organization's investments account for a larger portion
of the organization's capital, earnings, and activity."1
While the January 2001 proposed rule maintains that
merchant banking poses increased risk, the January 2001 proposed
rule abandons the principle that all merchant banking activity be
given the same capital treatment. This change in approach is a
reaction to the opponents of the March 2000 proposed rule who
objected to the "one-size-fits-all" approach to capital adequacy.202
The Subcommittee indicated that the one-size-fits-all
approach ignored the developed industry practice, and
discouraged the development of risk-based capital models to
manage risk internally. 203 SIA emphasized that merchant banking
practices were far more diverse than the Fed and Treasury had
recognized and, consequently, the rules did not accurately reflect
those varied practices. 20 While some securities firms maintained
higher capital levels for merchant banking positions, SIA argued,
those levels varied significantly from firm to firm, and even varied
within the same firm, from investment to investment.25 Even
where some securities firms maintained higher capital levels, those
internal models also applied lower capital charges to other assets,
199. Id. at 11.
200. Id. at 5.
201. Id.
202. January 2001 Proposed Rule, supra note 7, at 5.
203. Id.
204. H.R. Subcomm. Hearing, Lacritz Statement, supra note 55. "For example,
when banks invest as limited partners in independent SBICs, the diversification they
achieve with respect to the investment substantially mitigates the risk." Hearing on
Capital Markets in the New Economy Before the H.R. Subcomm. On Capital Mrkts.,
Sec. and Gov't Sponsored Enterprises (June 7, 2000) (statement by Lee W. Mercer,
National Association of Small Business Investment Companies), available at
http://www.house.gov/financialservices/6700mer.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2001)
[hereinafter HR.. Subcomm. Hearing, Mercer Statement].
205. H.R. Subcomm. Hearing, Lacritz Statement, supra note 55.
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which the firms regarded as comparatively safe."' Opponents of
the March 2000 proposed rule, therefore, contended that the
practices of the securities industry did not justify a single fifty
percent capital charge on all private equity positions."'
Here again the January 2001 proposed rule bends in
response to the criticism of commentators. The second proposal's
treatment of SBICs exemplifies this flexibility. By exempting
SBIC investments with carrying values of less than fifteen percent
of Tier 1 capital, the second proposal recognizes the importance of
merchant banking investment in SBICs as a source of capital for
U.S. business, job, and technology growth.0 ' Yet, the agencies also
temper this preference for SBICs by imposing a capital charge
when the investments in SBICs exceed a high threshold and
thereby pose greater risk to depository institutions. 9
Prior to the release of the January 2001 proposed rule, both
the Subcommittee and SIA believed that an adequate system was
already in place to oversee the safety and soundness of merchant
banking activities.210 According to the Subcommittee and SIA, the
Fed's supervisory authority better addressed the safety and
soundness concerns than the March 2000 proposed rule. "' The
Fed's Supervisory Letter2 . provides guidelines on equity
investment and merchant banking activities which contain detailed
directions to institutions.1 The Supervisory Letter thoroughly
discusses how to safely manage equity investments, and also sets
206. Id. SIA submits that "it is inappropriate for the Fed to extract a single part of
an internal securities capital model and to inject it out of context in an entirely
different arena-to mandate a bank regulatory capital requirement." Id.
207. Id. The Roundtable surveyed many of its members and was itself surprised to
learn that there is no common approach to addressing investment risk. H.R.
Subcomin. Hearing, Walker Testimony, supra note 92, at 3. Accordingly, the
Roundtable does not believe institutions' internal capital models provide support for
the application of a uniform fifty percent regulatory capital charge. Id.
208. H.R.. Subcomm. Hearing, Mercer Statement. See also January 2001 Proposed
Rule supra note 7, at 7.
209. January 2001 Proposed Rule supra note 7, at 7.
210. See Baker Letter, supra note 179; H.R. Subcomm. Hearing, Lacrltz
Statement, supra note 55.
211. See Baker Letter, supra note 179; H.R. Subcomm. Hearing, Lacrltz
Statement, supra note 55.
212. Supervisory Letter, supra note 8.
213. See Baker Letter, supra note 179.
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forth clear manifests for the examiners of financial institutions to
determine the adequacy of risk management and capital allocation
models of the subject institutions."4 Further, appropriate banking
regulators are notified of new actors and significant new activity in
the merchant banking field by existing authority under GLBA.1 '
The regulators can then address any safety and soundness
concerns through the examiners' guidelines established in the
Supervisory Letter."'
Such an approach would differentiate poorly managed
firms from others and allow the Fed to focus on the poorly
managed firms." Moreover, it would encourage institutions to
develop sound internal merchant banking practices. 28 Certainly, a
supervisory approach would promote the intent of Congress to
create a "two way street" in the financial services industry. 9
The Fed and the OCC agree that examination and
supervision on a case-by-case basis is an important method for
assuring that individual organizations have adequate capital to
support their merchant banking investments, and that the
organizations are conducting these equity investment activities in a
safe and sound manner." Indeed, in assessing capital adequacy,
the agencies intend to use the supervisory process to consider,
among other things, the institution's internal allocation of capital
to equity investment activities.'
Yet, based on their supervisory experience and analysis, the
Fed and OCC believe that this supervisory action alone is not
sufficient. Instead, the agencies feel that their supervisory power
must also be coupled with a minimum capital requirement for
investment activities.22 The agencies explain that establishing
214. Id.
215. GLB requires financial holding companies entering the merchant banking
arena to submit notification to the Fed. See Baker Letter, supra note 179.
Thereafter, notice must be given of any new merchant banking investment activities
greater than $200 million or five percent of tier one capital (whichever is less). Id.
216. See Baker Letter, supra note 179.
217. HR. Subcomm. Hearing, Lacritz Statement, supra note 55.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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minimum capital requirements reduces the potential that capital
requirements at an organization will be arbitrarily set during the
examination process. Also capital requirements indicate the
agencies' expectations for additional capital support of merchant
banking activities to organizations that are entering merchant
banking for the first time.2"
The January 2001 proposed rule's progressive structure
more successfully balances the industry needs that drove the
financial modernization of GLBA with the legitimate safety and
soundness concerns surrounding merchant banking investments.
The varying regulatory capital charges of the January 2001
proposed rule are significant reductions from the fifty percent
proposal for merchant banking investments, while the nuance of
the sliding scale recognizes that one-size does not fit all. As Beth
L. Climo, executive director of the American Bankers Association
commented, "It's a much more reasonable proposal than the [fifty
percent], across the board, one-size-fits all capital charge.'
VIII. CONCLUSION
By incorporating the merchant banking provisions in
GLBA, Congress attempted to "limit any unduly burdensome
restrictions put forth by the financial regulators.""2 The March
2000 proposed rule, however, was just such a restriction. The
proposal ultimately would have inhibited FHCs' and BHCs' efforts
to participate in private equity investment, while conversely
preventing those currently engaged in private equity investment
from becoming FHCs or BHCs.
223. Id.
224. Bank Rules Are Eased for Stakes in Nonfinancial Firms, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19,
2001, at C20.
225. Subcommittees Schedule Joint Hearing, supra note 69. Senate Banking
Committee member, Rod Grams (R-MN) similarly indicated, "As securities and
insurance companies had full merchant banking authority, restrictions on merchant
banking had the potential to, in effect, make the two way street a one way street as a
financial holding company with tight restrictions on merchant banking would be
unappealing for securities firms in particular." Merchant Banking Regulations
Pursuant to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Hearing before the S. Banking
Comm. (June 13, 2000) (opening statement of Senator Rod Grams), available at




Financial institutions have effectively engaged in private
equity investment for years. The safety and soundness concerns of
the Fed and Treasury did not justify the detrimental affect of the
fifty percent capital charge on the financial modernization of
GLBA. While private equity investment is a risky activity that
requires plenty of capital backing,"' the overwhelming response of
industry participants, as well as Congress, warranted the revisions
of the March 2000 proposed rule that appear in the January 2001
proposed rule.
ASHLEY D. FLUHME
226. For instance, on October 18, 2000, Chase Manhattan Corp. said its equity
investment unit lost $25 million in the third quarter, compared with a $377 million
gain in the year-earlier period. Barbara A. Rehm, Fed Backtracking on Merchant
Rules, AM. BANKER, Oct. 26, 2000, at 1.
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